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1 Introduction
Matching is a pervasive phenomenon that arises in many economic and social
settings.1 In a two-sided matching market, agents that belong to one of two dis-
joint sets, say colleges and students, have to be matched to each other. Agents—
both colleges and students—have preferences over the other side of the market
and over the prospect of being unmatched. The matching problem then reduces
to assigning students to colleges by means of a matching mechanism. Stability,
strategy-proofness, and (Pareto) efficiency of such mechanisms are highly valued
properties.2
The perhaps most famous matching mechanism relies on the deferred-accept-
ance algorithm introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). This algorithm was writ-
ten as a means to show that a stable matching always exists in a two-sided match-
ing market, transforming a matching where all agents are unmatched into a stable
matching. Besides guaranteeing stability, the Gale-Shapley mechanism has other
appealing properties: truth is a dominant strategy for one side of the market (Du-
bins and Freedman, 1981, Roth, 1982a) and it is efficient when welfare of both
sides of the market is considered (Roth, 1982a).
Many studies of strategic behavior under a matching mechanism rely on the
implausible assumption of complete information. Knowing the true preferences
of every agent in the market is more than we may reasonably expect from agents in
most matching markets. Roth (1989) made the first attempt to deal with the incom-
plete information case. Even though truth obviously remains a dominant strategy
for one side of the market when the Gale-Shapley mechanism is employed, the
equilibrium characterization for the complete information case is not robust to in-
complete information. Ehlers and Masso´ (2007) study the Bayes-Nash equilibria
of mechanisms that produce stable matchings and find a necessary and sufficient
condition for truth-telling to be an equilibrium. Roth and Rothblum (1999) and
Ehlers (2003, 2004) are less ambitious and do not aim at characterizing equilibria,
but give advice to individuals on how to act in matching markets when there is
uncertainty about the others’ strategies.
Still, many questions regarding strategic incentives under incomplete infor-
mation remain to be answered on theoretical grounds. How the amount of in-
1For example the assignment of civil servants to civil service positions, the admission of stu-
dents to colleges, some entry-level labor markets—as the widely explored market for graduating
physicians—, or the school choice problem are among the matching situations that have gained
attention in the last decades.
2A mechanism is stable if it always selects stable matchings; by definition, under a stable
matching every agent in the market prefers his partner to being alone and, moreover, no pair of
agents—consisting of a college and a student—who are not matched to each other would rather
prefer to be so matched. A mechanism is strategy-proof if it is immune to preference manipulation,
i.e., truth is a dominant strategy, and Pareto efficient if it always selects Pareto efficient matchings.
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formation held by individuals on the elements of the game actually influences
individuals’ decisions and affects the performance of matching mechanisms, are
questions to be explored. Barbera` and Dutta (1995) consider truth-telling as a
form of “protective” behavior, claiming that risk averse agents may revert to faith-
fully revealing their true preferences when they are poorly informed. Moreover,
in mechanisms for which truth is not a dominant strategy, computing the optimal
strategies requires a lot of information on others’ preferences. In this paper we
present an experimental study of these and other related claims, providing a direc-
tion into which the role of information on individual decisions may be ascertained.
Following a previous work by Pais and Pinte´r (Pais and Pinte´r, 2007) where
the role of information on decision making and the properties of several matching
mechanisms in the school choice model were examined in the experimental lab,
in this paper we pose similar questions in a more general matching model, the so
called college admissions model.3 In these problems, individuals of one side of
the market—let us call them teachers—have strict preferences over the agents of
the other side (schools). In contrast to the school choice model, in the college ad-
mission problem schools are assumed to be strategic agents with strict preference
ordering over teachers and a maximum capacity, i.e., the number of vacancies
that should be filled by teachers. Hence, in this model both sides of the market
act strategically. Therefore both teachers and schools may be interested in hiding
their true preferences.
We assess the influence of information in the Gale-Shapley mechanism and
in another well-known matching mechanism, the Top Trading Cycles mechanism
(TTC).4 Although the TTC mechanism was initially designed for situations where
indivisible objects have to be assigned to individuals, it can be fit to the college
admission problem by taking into consideration the schools’ preferences as well.
We provide an empirical test of the matching mechanisms with boundedly rational
individuals and address a series of practical questions. First, we compare the two
above mentioned mechanisms under three informational scenarios, ranging from
complete ignorance about the other participants’ preferences to complete infor-
mation on all elements of the game. In particular, we are interested in comparing
the incentives agents face under different mechanisms, as well as in comparing
efficiency levels and stability of the outcomes, for different information levels.
Second, within each mechanism, we evaluate the influence of the amount of in-
formation held by individuals on private decisions. We are concerned in testing
whether truth-telling emerges as a salient form of behavior among teachers when
3For details refer to Gale and Shapley (1962).
4School admission programs have become increasingly popular in the U.S. The best known
of these programs rely on the Boston mechanism (not considered in this study because of its
clear inferiority confirmed in Pais and Pinte´r, 2006) and the Gale-Shapley mechanism, which has
replaced the Boston mechanism in several cities.
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information is low. This would imply that, in markets where we expect agents to
know little about others, strategy-proofness of the mechanism should not drive the
choice of the matching mechanism. On the other hand, if we are able to determine
that information significantly affects individuals’ behavior, we can immediately
conclude that some of the existing theoretical results, which use the assumption
of complete information, are insufficient to deal with markets where agents know
little about others. Otherwise, if the effect of information is not relevant, theory
(with complete information) may be considered apt to deal with the incomplete
information case.
Our results support the first conjecture: information is important, there is
a large difference in individuals’ behavior between scenarios where they hold
almost no information on the elements of the game and those where informa-
tion held is substantial. In fact, in a very low informational environment, acting
straightforwardly is a salient form of behavior not only among teachers, but also
among schools. This result for the schools contradicts the theoretical results (for
complete information). In what stability is concerned, information has again an
important but contrary effect on the two mechanisms: while in the Gale-Shapley
mechanism the amount of information has a negative effect on the frequency of
stable outcomes, in the TTC mechanism this effect is positive. The same negative
relation can be observed between information and efficiency in the TTC mecha-
nism, while in Gale-Shapley mechanism efficiency is not sensitive to the amount
of information participants hold. Despite the simplicity of the experimental de-
sign, the comparison of the mechanisms may have important policy implications.
The results in this paper suggest that the Gale-Shapley mechanism proves to be
more successful than the TTC mechanism regarding both stability and efficiency.5
When examining strategy-proofness, the only significant difference in the propor-
tion of truthful play we find is in the partial-information treatment in favor of the
TTC mechanism.
There exist several experimental studies of matching problems, some of which
aim at testing the above mentioned mechanisms. Harrison and McCabe (1996)
explore the Gale-Shapley mechanism and show that profitable manipulation of
agents’ preferences and reaching an efficient outcome become more difficult as
markets get larger. Chen and So¨nmez (2002a) compare a random serial dictator-
ship mechanism used to allocate dormitory rooms in American universities with a
variant of the TTC in an incomplete information environment. They conclude
that the TTC produces significantly more efficient allocations. In a compan-
ion paper, Chen and So¨nmez (2002b) evaluate the performance of these mech-
anisms under complete information, reaching the same qualitative results. Chen
5These two are connected characteristics, because efficiency is measured here as the average
minimum distance from the core.
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and So¨nmez (2006) consider the school choice problem and analyze the TTC,
the Gale-Shapley, and the Boston mechanisms under (partially) incomplete infor-
mation, concluding that, in what efficiency is concerned, Gale-Shapley improves
upon the TTC, which outperforms the Boston mechanism. The difference be-
tween the above studies and this paper derives not only from the use of the college
admissions model, but also from our main objective: to test the role of information
in evaluating matching mechanisms.6
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the description and the theoreti-
cal properties of the matching mechanisms under study. Section 3 describes our
experimental design. Section 4 summarizes the main experimental results and
section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical results
Two-sided matching models have been developed to analyze situations in which
elements from the two (disjoint) sides of the market should be paired, where
each element has a preference ordering on the opposite side and both sides can
act strategically. In the assignment problem that we implemented in the experi-
mental lab a number of teachers is to fill a number of vacancies across different
schools. Each teacher is assumed to have a strict preference ordering over all
schools and each school is assumed to have a strict preference ordering over all
teachers, as well as a maximum number of teachers to employ (capacity). The
fact that both teachers and schools can act strategically and reveal orderings that
are different from the true preferences is what distinguishes this problem from the
school choice model.7
The outcome of the problem is a matching, an assignment of teachers to teach-
ing positions (schools), such that each teacher is assigned one vacancy and each
vacancy is filled by one teacher only. A matching is Pareto efficient if there is
no matching that assigns at least one participant a strictly better partner and every
other participant a weakly better mate. A matching is stable if every agent prefers
his partner to being alone and, moreover, no pair of agents (each on one side of the
market) who are not matched to each other would rather prefer to be so matched.
A matching mechanism consists of a strategy space for each participant—the
set of all possible preference orderings over the other side of the market—and a
function that selects a matching for each strategy profile. A matching mechanism
6Other experimental and empirical studies, dealing with matching mechanisms, are Olson and
Porter (1994), Nalbantian and Schotter (1995), Kagel and Roth (2000), U¨nver (2001), Haruvy,
Roth, and U¨nver (2006), and McKinney, Niederle, and Roth (2005).
7For a similar entry-level market analysis refer to Roth (1984) and for further theoretical details
to Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
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is efficient if it always chooses Pareto efficient matchings. It is strategy-proof if no
participant can profitably manipulate her preferences, independently of the other
agents’ strategies, and it is stable if it always selects stable matchings.
In what follows we briefly describe the two matching mechanisms whose em-
pirical properties we studied in the experimental lab. The presentation is tailored
to our example with teachers and schools.8
Mechanism 1. Gale-Shapley
1. Each teacher reports her preferences over the schools and each school re-
ports her preferences over the teachers.
2. Given the submitted preferences of the teachers and schools’ priority orders,
positions are allocated after undergoing the following steps:
(a) Each teacher proposes to her first ranked school. Each school keeps
the applicants with higher priority order on hold until positions are
filled, while rejecting the lowest priority teachers in excess of its ca-
pacity.
(b) In general at round k:
Every teacher who got rejected in the previous step proposes to the
next school on her list of preferences. Each school considers the teach-
ers on hold from the previous steps together with the new applicants.
The lowest priority teachers in excess of the school’s capacity are re-
jected, while remaining applicants are kept on hold.
(c) This process is repeated until no applications are rejected. Each par-
ticipant is then assigned the position at the school that keeps her on
hold.
The Gale-Shapley mechanism is strategy-proof for the proposing side; in our
case truth is a dominant strategy for teachers. However, schools may gain by
manipulating their messages and not reporting their preferences truthfully. There-
fore, we expect a different kind of behavior from teachers and schools: teachers
should faithfully reveal their true preferences over schools independently of the
information they hold, while among schools we expect to find some preference
manipulation. The Gale-Shapley mechanism is stable and it is also Pareto effi-
cient when the welfare of both sides of the market is taken into account.
8The choice of these two mechanisms is a result of balancing the theoretical importance of
the mechanisms and time constraints in the experimental lab. The study of other mechanisms
presented in the literature, like the Boston algorithm studied in Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2006),
constitute areas for further research.
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Although the other—TTC—mechanism was initially designed for situations
where indivisible objects had to be assigned to individuals, it can be fit to the
college admissions problems by taking into consideration the schools’ preferences
as well (see the description of the mechanism below).
Mechanism 2. Top Trading Cycles (TTC)
1. Each school reports her preferences over the teachers and each teacher
reports her preferences over the schools.
2. An ordering (a queue) of teachers is randomly chosen.
3. For any submitted profile of teachers’ preferences, schools’ preferences, and
ordering of teachers, the outcome is obtained after undergoing the following
steps:
(a) A tentative assignment is made in the following way. Given the submit-
ted preferences of schools, each schools gets assigned its top-ranked
teachers up to capacity. In case a teacher is preferred by several
schools, she gets assigned to the school she prefers (according to her
submitted preference ordering), and the other schools keep this posi-
tion vacant.
(b) The first teacher in the random ordering proposes to her top ranked
school. If either nobody or she was tentatively assigned to this school,
the assignment is finalized and both the teacher and this teaching po-
sition are removed from the system. The procedure continues with the
second teacher in the ordering. Otherwise, the first teacher in the or-
dering who was tentatively assigned to the desired position is inserted
in the top of the ordering.
(c) When the ordering is modified, this procedure is repeated, so that the
teacher who just became first in the ordering sends an application to
her highest-ranked school. If either nobody was assigned tentatively
or she has priority at this school, the assignment is finalized and the
procedure continues with the next teacher in line; otherwise, the first
teacher in the ordering with priority at the proposed school is inserted
in the top of the ordering, in front of the requester.
(d) If a cycle forms, it consists of a sequence of proposals of the kind: A
proposes to the school where B was tentatively assigned, B applies to
C’s priority school, and C proposes to A’s priority school. In such
cases, all teachers in the cycle are assigned to the schools they pro-
posed to and teachers and their respective assignments are removed
from the system.
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(e) The procedure stops when all teachers are assigned to a position.
The TTC mechanism in this setting is strategy-proof for agents on the propos-
ing side, i.e., for teachers, but schools may gain with untruthful behavior. The
mechanism is Pareto efficient for reported preferences, but it is not stable.9 We
thus expect to observe different behavior from teachers and schools regarding
faithfulness—just as in the Gale-Shapley mechanism.
If theory is to be confirmed, the Gale-Shapley mechanism should outperform
the TTC in terms of stability, while regarding truthful preference revelation and
efficiency the two mechanisms should perform similarly in the experimental lab.
3 Experimental design
Economic experiments with different informational settings have been designed to
analyze the empirical behavior of the above described two matching mechanisms.
We use a 2x3 design, i.e., we construct three treatments (for both mechanisms)
differing in the amount of information held by participants on the elements of
the game. This allows us to compare individual decisions in six treatments. Our
analysis concentrates on the role of information in truthful preference revelation,
in efficiency, and in stability. The environment is designed to capture the key
aspects and difficulties of each mechanism, under a controlled environment, with
relatively small groups of participants.
At the beginning of each session participants were randomly and anonymously
assigned a role: teacher (J, K, L, M, or N) or school (A, B, or C). These roles
were maintained during the session. Participants were told that they had been
sorted in anonymous groups of eight (five teachers and three schools). In each
group there were five vacancies across three schools differing in capacity and
desirability, and each position was to be assigned to one teacher only. Preferences
over the agents of the other side of the market were induced by the monetary
payoff participants obtained depending on their position in the resulting matching
at the end of the experiment. The payoff tables were designed to create a strategic
conflict situation. The payoffs obtained by teachers and schools were symmetric
as every teacher got 15e for her top choice, 9e for the second choice, and 3e for
the last choice; while each school got 15e for her top choice, 12e for the second
choice, 9e for the third choice, 6e for the fourth choice, and 3e for the last (fifth)
choice.
9Note also that, in this setting, the resulting final assignment is independent of the random
ordering of teachers defined in step 2, as proved in Theorem 3 in Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez
(1999).
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Different teachers and schools did not need to agree on which school or teacher
was her top, her second, etc., last choice, respectively. The payoffs of different
outcomes were sufficiently dispersed so as to have a monetarily salient difference
between getting one’s best and one’s worst choice. In what follows we compare
individual reports to the induced preference orderings and treat the latter as the
true preference ordering.
Under each mechanism, each group of participants played the game three
times, receiving three different amounts of information in an increasing way. In
order to avoid participants from playing from memory when the mechanism was
changed, we shuffled the labeling of schools and modified school characteristics
accordingly. It follows that each participant kept the same role throughout the
whole experiment, even though her payoff matrix seemingly changed.10
In each experimental session the following three different informational treat-
ments were implemented in case of both mechanisms:
• Zero information: Each participant knows her own induced preferences
(i.e., the row of the payoff matrix that corresponds to her role), but not the
other participants’ preferences. She is only told that different participants
might have different payoff tables. In this treatment teachers and schools
have no information about the other side’s induced preferences, but they are
told the capacity of each school.
• Partial information: Besides the own induced preferences and the capac-
ity of each school, teachers and schools have some information about the
preference orderings of the other side of the market. Each teacher is given
the list of favorite teacher(s) of each school (up to capacity) and each school
is told the top choice of each teacher.
• Full information: Each participant has complete information on the pref-
erences of all participants and the capacity of schools.
In the case of the TTC mechanism, as the schools’ priority orderings are re-
flected in the tentative assignment, under the partial-information treatment partic-
ipants are told—besides their own induced preferences—the tentative assignment
of all participants given the induced preferences. Under the full-information treat-
ment they know both the induced preferences of all participants and the tentative
assignment. In these two treatments participants are reminded that this initial
10Since our objective is to compare how individuals make their decisions with different amount
of information available, in our experimental design subjects participate in the mechanisms under
all three informational conditions. The sequence of the informational treatments follows the natu-
ral path, i.e., we start with no information and proceed towards the setting with full information.
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assignment may change as schools and/or teachers might manipulate their prefer-
ences.
Three sessions were conducted with undergraduate students from the Uni-
versitat Auto`noma de Barcelona, recruited using classroom announcements and
posters throughout the campus, where the experimental sessions (on paper/by
hand) took place. Overall 72 subjects divided into 9 groups participated in the
experiment. Each subject was allowed to participate in one session only. Sub-
jects were informed that they would participate in a decision making task. At the
beginning of each session, they were randomly seated at the tables and printed
instructions were given to them. Before starting a mechanism, the corresponding
instructions were read aloud. In each session and for each informational setting
participants were asked to submit a preference ordering, from their top choice to
the last. In each session six treatments were implemented. In this way we have
observed six decisions from each participant, each under a different mechanism
and/or different informational setting. The order of implementation of the mecha-
nisms and informational settings—to avoid learning about others’ preferences—is
listed in table 1.
Table 1: List of treatments implemented in the experimental lab.
Code Mechanism Information
1st GS0 Gale-Shapley zero
2nd GS1 Gale-Shapley partial
3rd GS2 Gale-Shapley full
4th TTC0 Top trading cycles zero
5th TTC1 Top trading cycles partial
6th TTC2 Top trading cycles full
Subjects did not get any feedback about previous decisions or outcomes at
any moment of the experiment. At the end of each session, one of the six treat-
ments was chosen randomly for payment, matching was determined for the chosen
treatment, and earnings were paid. Sessions lasted for about 90 minutes and the
average net payment—including a 3e show-up fee—was around 16e .11
11The appendix contains the decision sheets for the Gale-Shapley mechanism, for each infor-
mation treatment. The instructions and the decision sheets for the TTC mechanism are available
upon request from the authors.
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4 Experimental results
Our main aim is to examine the importance of the level of information that par-
ticipants hold in the two matching mechanisms. The experimental setting we use
allows us to analyze simultaneously the role of information in private decisions
and whether it affects the empirical properties of the mechanisms. The first ques-
tion is whether individuals report their preferences truthfully. We study whether
the amount of information given to the participants influences truthful preference
revelation. And, on the other hand, whether under the same informational setting,
truthful preference revelation changes with the implemented mechanism. The
question is the same regarding stability and efficiency. Again, we compare sta-
bility and efficiency levels under each mechanism across information settings and
across different mechanisms for the same information level.
4.1 Truthful preference revelation
Table 2 shows the proportion of teachers and schools who played truthfully. Re-
member that according to theoretical results truth is a dominant strategy for teach-
ers in both mechanisms, but it is not for schools. Therefore, we expect a significant
number of schools manipulating their messages in both mechanisms.
Table 2: Proportion of truthful preference revelation.
Gale-Shapley TTC
Info treatment Teachers Schools Teachers Schools
Zero (0) 76% 48% 84% 67%
Partial (1) 58% 33% 71% 37%
Full (2) 60% 22% 62% 33%
Our data shows that the proportion of truthful preference revelation of teachers—
for whom both mechanisms are strategy-proof—varies between 84% and 58%,
depending on both the informational setting and the implemented mechanism.
Considering the results of similar experiments12, we note that these proportions
are relatively high in general, which may also be due to the fact that potentially
profitable manipulations for teachers are very limited in a three school setup.13
12For results on preference manipulation in the school choice model see for example, Chen and
So¨nmez (2006), Chen and So¨nmez (2002a), and Pais and Pinte´r (2007).
13Since there are only three schools in the experiment, even if a subject is randomizing there is a
1/6 chance of truth-telling. Moreover, ranking the second best school first is the unique potentially
profitable manipulation.
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Still, given that even under both strategy-proof mechanisms we observe misrep-
resentation of preferences, it remains important to examine who manipulates the
preferences and in which manner. We identify three possible ways of preference
manipulation for teachers. We noticed that a substantial proportion of the teach-
ers has ranked the school where she has priority higher in the submitted ranking
than it would be according to the induced preferences, this is what we call the
“Priority School Bias” (PSB). The second identified way of manipulating the true
preferences is to underrank the most competitive school (i.e., the school with only
one vacancy). This behavior we call—following Chen and So¨nmez—the “Small
School Bias” (SSB). The third manipulation method (PSB&SSB) is the simul-
taneous use of both previously described ways.14 By comparing the payoffs that
teachers earn, we confirm that untruthful behavior is costly, as on average a teacher
who manipulated her preferences lost 1.98e in the Gale-Shapley mechanism and
2.43e in the TTC mechanism. This is not surprising given that both mechanisms
are strategy-proof for teachers.
Among schools preference manipulation is much more frequent but this is not
surprising given the predictions of theory (for this side of the market it is not
dominant to reveal truthfully their induced preferences). Note that it may also
be due to the fact that schools have to rank 5 candidates whereas teachers rank
only 3 schools (as explained above). We can observe that the proportion of pref-
erence manipulation among schools varies between 78% and 44%, depending on
the mechanism and the amount of information these participants hold. In general,
we can see that as players get more information about the elements of the game,
the proportion of schools that reveal the preferences truthfully decreases, in both
mechanisms. In the case of the schools we can also observe that schools tend to
rank higher those teachers who rank them higher in their (induced) preferences.
This may mean that schools recognize the teachers’ incentives for truthful play
and therefore with this kind of preference manipulations they pretend to “ensure”
themselves an acceptable—although not the top—candidate. We can distinguish
two versions of this general way of manipulating preferences: there are schools
that only manipulate the candidates that are out of its capacity in the induced pref-
erence list (i.e., changing the order of the last four or three candidates, depending
on the number of vacancies the school has); while there are schools that manipu-
late over the whole list. Comparing the earnings, we can conclude that, in general,
this strategic behavior results successful, as schools that decide to manipulate their
preferences earn slightly more than if they did not do so. This difference is 0.47e
for the Gale-Shapley mechanism, and 0.13e for the TTC mechanism. Although
these average gains are small, and individually there may be schools that loose,
14In case of the zero-information setting it does not make sense to check for PSB as participants
have no information about the priorities of the schools.
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this result shows that schools manage to benefit from preference manipulation.
Our main findings related to truthful behavior and based on the statistical anal-
ysis of the data are summarized in results 1a and 1b.
Result 1a: The amount of information has a significant negative effect on
teachers’ truthfulness under both mechanisms. The more information teachers
receive, the lower the proportion of truthful reports.
Statistical evidence. Under both mechanisms, the null hypothesis of equal pro-
portions of truthful preference revelation across the three informational settings
can be rejected at 5% significance level.15 The results of the pairwise comparisons
(with the corresponding significance level based on Cochran’s test) are in Table
3.16 For both mechanisms, the zero-information setting resulted in a significantly
Table 3: Pairwise comparisons of truthful behavior. Difference between treat-
ments. *Difference significant at 10%. **Difference significant at 5%.
Teachers Schools
Mechanism 0 - 1 0 - 2 1 - 2 0 - 1 0 - 2 1 - 2
Gale-Shapley 17.8%** 15.6%* -2.0% 15.0% 25.9%** 11.0%
TTC 13.3%* 22.2%** 9.0% 29.6%** 33.3%** 4.0%
higher proportion of truth-telling than in any other treatment where teachers got
additional information about other participants’ preferences. Interestingly, there
is no significant difference regarding truthful preference revelation between the
partial and the full information settings under any of the mechanisms.
As for the other side of the market, theory predicts that preference manipula-
tion may represent a profitable strategy for schools.
Result 1b: The amount of information has a significant negative effect on
schools’ truthfulness under both mechanisms. The more information schools re-
ceive, the lower the proportion of truthful reports.
Statistical evidence. Under both mechanisms, the null hypothesis of equal pro-
portions of truthful preference revelation across the three informational settings
can be rejected at 5% significance level.17 The results of the pairwise compar-
isons can be found in table 3.
15The value of the Cochran’s Q test statistics is 6.71 for the Gale-Shapley mechanism and 6.61
for the TTC.
16For details about Cochran’s test for related observations refer to Conover (1980).
17The value of the Cochran’s test statistics is 7.4 for the Gale-Shapley mechanism and 9.73 for
the TTC.
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For both mechanisms the zero-information setting results in a significantly
higher proportion of truth-telling than the full information one and in the case of
the TTC mechanism the difference is significant between the zero and the partial
information settings as well. This difference comes from the high proportion of
truth-telling in this mechanism under the zero-information setting. There is no
significant difference regarding truthful preference revelation between the partial
and full information settings, in any of the mechanisms.
Regarding differences in truthfulness across mechanisms, truthful preference
revelation is slightly higher in the TTC mechanism under every treatment, even
though Cochran’s test confirms a significant difference only in the partial-information
treatment.
4.2 Stability and efficiency
The other two important properties of a matching mechanism are stability and
efficiency. Recall that the Gale-Shapley mechanism generates outcomes that are
stable with respect to the submitted preferences, while the TTC mechanism does
not fulfil this property. The average stability of a treatment is calculated as the
proportion of stable matchings with true preferences among all the matchings re-
alized. The set of stable (core) matchings for both mechanisms is listed in table
4.
Table 4: Set of stable matchings. *T.opt. - teacher optimal, S.opt - student opti-
mal, T.b. - truthful behavior.
School - Teacher School - Teacher School - Teacher Note*
1.
A - L B - M, N C - J, K
T.opt., T.b.
6 - 9 21 - 15, 15 15 - 9, 15
2.
A - L B - K, M C - J, N
6 - 9 27 - 9, 15 18 - 9, 9
3.
A - N B - K, M C - J, L
S.opt.
15 - 3 27 - 9, 15 27 - 9, 3
The proportion of stable outcomes varied between 0% and 66.7% across mech-
anisms and informational settings in the experiment.
Result 2: Depending on the information setting, there exists a significant dif-
ference in stability between the Gale-Shapley and the TTC mechanisms. Both
mechanisms are sensitive to the amount of information that participants hold, but
the effect of information on stability is the opposite in the two mechanisms.
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Statistical evidence. Our results show that (on average) stability in the Gale-Shapley
mechanism (52%) is higher than in the TTC mechanism (33%). However, de-
pending on the information setting this difference can be insignificant. When
comparing the proportion of stable outcomes across the mechanisms (under the
same information treatment), we find that the difference is highly significant in
the zero- and full-information treatments, while it is not significant in the partial-
information treatment. The proportion of stable matchings in each treatment that
support the result are to be found in table 5. Apparently the amount of informa-
Table 5: Proportion of stable matchings.




tion has an important effect on the stability of the mechanisms. For both mech-
anisms the null hypothesis of equal proportions of stable outcomes across the
three information treatments is rejected at the usual significance levels.18 In the
Gale-Shapley mechanism stability is significantly higher in the zero-information
treatment than in any other treatment with additional information, but there is
no significant difference in stability between the partial- and full-information set-
tings. In case of the TTC mechanisms the difference in stability is highly sig-
nificant between any two information treatments. While in the Gale-Shapley
mechanism with the increase of the amount of information—and of preference
manipulation—the ratio of the stable matchings decreases, in the TTC mechanism
we observe the opposite: as more information is available and preference manip-
ulation gets more frequent, the likelihood of getting a stable outcome increases.
The results of the pairwise comparisons are in table 6.
Table 6: Pairwise comparisons of stability. Difference between treatments.
***Difference significant at 1%.
Mechanism 0 - 1 0 - 2 1 - 2
Gale-Shapley 18.5%*** 18.5%*** 0.0%
TTC 32.1%*** 66.7%*** 35.6%***
18The test statistics of the Cochran’s test is 19.57 in the Gale-Shapley mechanism, and 75.45 in
the TTC mechanism.
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Following Harrison and McCabe (1996) we define efficiency as the minimum
payoff distance to the core using the cardinal information contained in the payoff
tables.19 First, we compute the absolute value of the difference between the core
payoff and the realized payoff for each group and for each core outcome. With
this we have for each group the distance to each of the three stable outcomes our
games have. Then, we choose the minimum over these three distances, and this is
the measure we will use to evaluate efficiency.
We are concerned about the possible differences in efficiency across differ-
ent information settings and also between the two mechanisms. If we find that
efficiency depends on the amount of information participants hold, this directly
implies that under some informational treatment(s) stability is significantly higher
than in some other(s). Now let us focus on the effect of information on efficiency.
Result 3: In the Gale-Shapley mechanism there is no significant difference in
efficiency across the three informational settings. In the case of the TTC mecha-
nism there is a significant difference in efficiency: in the zero-information setting
efficiency is significantly lower.
Statistical evidence. Under the Gale-Shapley mechanism the hypothesis of equal
efficiency (equal distance to the core) across the three informational settings can
not be rejected at the usual significance levels, whereas under the TTC mecha-
nism the same hypothesis can be rejected.20 The average distance from the core
in the zero-information setting is significantly higher than either in the partial-
infomation or the full-information setting. We do not find any significant differ-
ence regarding efficiency between the partial and full information settings. The
results of pairwise comparisons (with the corresponding significance levels) can
be found in table 8.21
Result 4: If participants have no information about the preferences of other
participants, the Gale-Shapley mechanism performs significantly better than the
TTC mechanism in terms of efficiency. In case participants have additional in-
formation, there is no significant difference in efficiency between the two mecha-
nisms.
Statistical evidence. In the zero-information treatment the Wilcoxon signed ranks
test confirms that the average minimum distance from the core is significantly
19We have chosen the measure used in Harrison and McCabe (1996) as an indicator of effi-
ciency, because in our example there does note exist a unique Pareto efficient matching that could
serve as a reference point. In our experimental matching market 23 (of the 30 possible) matchings
are Pareto efficient, yielding 8 different possible social welfare levels. This makes meaningless
the use of usual efficiency measures, such as the proportion of Pareto efficient outcomes or the
realized social payoff relative to the wealth of the socially efficient outcome.
20The test statistics of the Quade test is 11.262.
21For more details about the Quade’s test for related observations refer to Conover (1980).
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Table 7: Efficiency. Distance from the core.




Table 8: Pairwise comparison of efficiency. Difference between treatments.
***Difference significant at 1%.
Mechanism 0 - 1 0 - 2 1 - 2
Gale-Shapley -12.3 -12.3 0.0
TTC 15.7*** 28.3*** 12.7
higher under the TTC mechanism than under the Gale-Shapley mechanism, at
any significance level no lower than 1.4%.22 This implies a significantly higher
efficiency level under the Gale-Shapley mechanism. The same test in the partial-
information setting can not detect a significant difference in efficiency (the test
statistics is -0.677) between the two mechanisms. In the full-information setting
the difference in efficiency between the two mechanisms is significant only at a
significance level higher than 8.8%.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we examine the so called college admissions model that is closely
related to the school choice problem. We analyze two well-known matching
mechanisms—the Gale-Shapley and the TTC mechanisms—under three differ-
ent informational settings. Our experimental design allows us—besides providing
an empirical test of matching mechanisms with boundedly rational individuals—
to analyze two main questions. Firstly, we compare the two mechanisms in terms
of strategy proofness and efficiency in three informational settings. Secondly, we
evaluate the effect of the amount of information held by individuals on decision
making.
Our results show that in each mechanism having more information about oth-
22The test statistics for the Wilcoxon signed ranks test is -2.203. The null hypothesis of equal
efficiency can be rejected in favor of the left-tailed alternative hypothesis. For more details about
the Wilcoxon signed ranks test check Conover (1980).
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ers’ preferences results in a lower proportion of truth-telling for teachers. That is,
in case teachers have partial or full information about the elements of the game,
a significantly higher number of participants manipulate their preferences than
when they only know their own preferences. This result is consistent with the
results presented in Pais and Pinte´r (2007) for the school choice model, but differs
in intensity, as when schools may also behave strategically the preference manip-
ulation rate is higher—specially under the TTC mechanism—than when schools
are mere objects to be distributed among teachers. Although these differences in
teachers’ preference manipulation across the two matching models are only signif-
icant in the TTC mechanism under the zero- and full information treatments23, our
results suggest that teachers anticipate the strategic behavior of schools and adjust
their decisions to it. The behavior of schools shows a similar pattern regarding
truth-telling—more information means less truthfulness—, however preference
manipulation for schools is predicted by theory.
Regarding efficiency—measured as a distance to the core—information is rel-
evant only in the TTC mechanism, where we detect a significantly lower efficiency
level in the zero information setting. In the case of the Gale-Shapley mechanism
all three treatments yield the same (relatively high) efficiency as well as stabil-
ity levels. When comparing the two mechanisms in terms of efficiency, we find
that the Gale-Shapley mechanism performs better than the TTC mechanism, as
in the zero-information setting—when preference manipulation is low—it clearly
outperforms the TTC mechanism. Examining our results regarding stability we
observe that in the TTC mechanism stability increases with the amount of infor-
mation. Comparing these results with Pais and Pinte´r (2007), we suspect that it is
due to the activity of the schools, as in the school choice model stability was very
low for any informational environment.
We conclude that the comparison of the mechanisms suggests the superiority
of the Gale-Shapley mechanism in the college admissions model. Although re-
garding truthful preference revelation—depending on the implemented informa-
tional setting—it may give similar results to the TTC mechanism, in the achieved
efficiency level and stability the Gale-Shapley mechanism performs clearly better
than the Gale-Shapley mechanism.
We also find that the amount of information plays an important role in partic-
ipants’ decision making. In general, if participants—both teachers and schools—
only know their own preferences they are more likely to play truthfully than in
case of having additional information.
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A Decision Sheet for the GS mechanism – zero-information
treatment – teachers
You are participant ID ......, in the role of teacher J.
Capacity: There are two positions opening at school B and C, and one at
school A.
Recall: Your payoff amount depends on the school position you hold at the
end of the experiment. Your possible payoff amounts are outlined in the following
table:
Position received at school A B C
Your payoff 15 3 9
This means, that if at the end of the experiment you hold a position:
• at school A, you will be paid 15 e;
• at school B, you will be paid 3 e;
• at school C, you will be paid 9 e.
Recall! Other participants might have different payoff tables.
Recall! The preference ordering submitted on the Decision Sheet does not
necessarily need to coincide with the one generated by the payoff matrix.
Recall! There are two positions opening at school B and C, and one at school
A.
Priority ordering of schools: Schools when offering teaching positions con-
sider the quality of each applicant and the experience they have; and on this basis
they make a priority ordering of all candidates. In this first informational environ-
ment of the experiment you do not know anything about this ordering.
Please submit your ranking of schools (A through C) from your first choice to
your last choice. Please rank ALL three schools!
1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice
This is the end of the first game under the first mechanism.
After the experimenter collects your Decision Sheet, you will be given the
second Decision Sheet under the same mechanism, but for a new game (with
different information structure).
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B Decision Sheet for mechanism GS – zero-information
treatment – schools
You are participant ID ......, in the role of school A.
Capacity: There are two positions opening at school B and C, and one at
school A.
Recall: Your payoff amount depends on the school position you hold at the
end of the experiment. Your possible payoff amounts are outlined in the following
table:
Teacher employed J K L M N
Your payoff 3 9 6 12 15
This means, that if at the end of the experiment you are matched with teacher:
• J, you will be paid 3 e;
• K, you will be paid 9 e;
• L, you will be paid 6 e;
• M, you will be paid 12 e;
• N, you will be paid 15 e.
Recall! Different participants might have different payoff tables.
Recall! The preference ordering submitted on the Decision Sheet does not
necessarily need to coincide with the one generated by the payoff matrix.
Recall! There are two positions opening at school B and C, and one at school
A.
Priority ordering of teachers: Teachers when applying to schools, make a
priority ordering of all schools. In this first informational environment of the
experiment you do not know anything about this ordering.
Please submit your ranking of teachers (J through N) from your first choice to
your last choice. Please rank ALL five teachers!
1st option 2nd option 3rd option 4th option 5th option
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This is the end of the first game under the first mechanism.
After the experimenter collects your Decision Sheet, you will be given the
second Decision Sheet under the same mechanism, but for a new game (with
different information structure).
C Decision Sheet for mechanism GS – partial-information
treatment – teachers
You are participant ID ......, in the role of teacher J.
Capacity: There are two positions opening at school B and C, and one at
school A.
Recall: Your payoff amount depends on the school position you hold at the
end of the experiment. Your possible payoff amounts are outlined in the following
table:
Position received at school A B C
Your payoff 15 3 9
This means, that if at the end of the experiment you hold a position:
• at school A, you will be paid 15 e;
• at school B, you will be paid 3 e;
• at school C, you will be paid 9 e.
Recall! Different participants might have different payoff tables. That is,
payoff by school might be different for different participants.
Recall! The preference ordering submitted on the Decision Sheet does not
necessarily need to coincide with the one generated by the payoff matrix.
Recall! There are two positions opening at school B and C, and one at school
A.
Priority ordering of schools: Schools when offering teaching positions con-
sider the quality of each applicant and the experience they have; and on this basis
they make a priority ordering of all candidates. In this informational environment
from the priority ordering of the schools you know only the best candidate(s) of
each school. These are the following:
• at school A teacher N has priority;
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• at school B teachers K and M have priority;
• at school C teachers J (you) and L have priority.
Please submit your ranking of the schools (A through C) from your first choice
to your last choice. Please rank ALL three schools!
1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice
This is the end of the second game under the first mechanism.
After the experimenter collects your Decision Sheet, you will be given the
second Decision Sheet under the same mechanism, but for a new game (with
different information structure).
D Decision Sheet for mechanism GS – partial-information
treatment – schools
You are participant ID ......, in the role of school A.
Capacity: There are two positions opening at school B and C, and one at
school A.
Recall: Your payoff amount depends on the school position you hold at the
end of the experiment. Your possible payoff amounts are outlined in the following
table:
Teacher employed J K L M N
Your payoff 3 9 6 12 15
This means, that if at the end of the experiment you are matched with teacher:
• J, you will be paid 3 e;
• K, you will be paid 9 e;
• L, you will be paid 6 e; etc.
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Recall! Different participants might have different payoff tables.
Recall! The preference ordering submitted on the Decision Sheet does not
necessarily need to coincide with the one generated by the payoff matrix.
Recall! There are two positions opening at school B and C, and one at school
A.
Priority ordering of teachers: Teachers when applying to schools, make a
priority ordering of all schools. In this informational environment of the game
you know in which school would each teacher get the highest payoff (according
to the payoff table, but not the submitted ordering).
Please submit your ranking of teachers (J through N) from your first choice to
your last choice. Please rank ALL five teachers!
1st option 2nd option 3rd option 4th option 5th option
This is the end of the second game under the first mechanism.
After the experimenter collects your Decision Sheet, you will be given the last
Decision Sheet under the same mechanism, but for a new game (with different
information structure).
E Decision Sheet for mechanism GS – full-information
treatment – teachers
You are participant ID ......, in the role of teacher J.
Capacity: There are two positions opening at school B and C, and one at
school A.
Recall: Your payoff amount depends on the school position you hold at the
end of the experiment. Your possible payoff amounts are outlined in the following
table:
Position received at school A B C
Payoff of participant J (YOU) 15 3 9
Payoff of participant K 3 9 15
Payoff of participant L 9 15 3
Payoff of participant M 9 15 3
Payoff of participant N 3 15 9
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This means, that for example, if at the end of the experiment:
• you hold a position at school A, teachers K and L hold a position at school
B, and teachers M and N hold a position at school C, the payoffs would be
the following:
• you would be paid 15e; teacher K would get 9e; teacher L would get 15e;
teacher M would get 3e; and teacher N would get 9e.
¡Recall! The preference ordering submitted on the Decision Sheet does not
necessarily need to coincide with the one generated by the payoff matrix.
Priority ordering of schools: Schools when offering teaching positions con-
sider the quality of each applicant and the experience they have; and on this basis
they make a priority ordering of all candidates. In this informational environment
the complete priority ordering of the schools is known by each teacher, and is
shown in the following table:
School A School B School C
1st choice N M L
2nd choice M K J (YOU)
3rd choice K J (YOU) M
4th choice L N N
5th choice J (YOU) L K
Please submit your ranking of the schools (A through C) from your first choice
to your last choice. Please rank ALL three schools!
1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice
This is the end of the games under the first mechanism. After we collect your
Decision Sheet, you will be given the Instructions and the first Decision Sheet for
a new mechanism.
F Decision Sheet for mechanism GS – full-information
treatment – schools
You are participant ID ......, in the role of school A.
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Capacity: There are two positions opening at school B and C, and one at
school A.
Recall: Your payoff amount depends on the school position you hold at the
end of the experiment. Your possible payoff amounts are outlined in the following
table:
Teacher employed J K L M N
School A (YOU) 3 9 6 12 15
School B 9 12 3 15 6
School C 12 3 15 9 6
This means, that if at the end of the experiment:
• You are matched with teacher J, school B with teachers K and L, and school
C with teachers M and N, the payoffs would be the following:
• You would get 3e; school B: 15e (12e +3e); and school C 15e (9e +6e).
¡Recall! The preference ordering submitted on the Decision Sheet does not
necessarily need to coincide with the one generated by the payoff matrix.
Priority ordering of teachers: Teachers when applying to schools, make a
priority ordering of all schools. In this informational environment of the game all
participants know the complete payoff matrix of teachers, which is the following:
Teacher J K L M N
1st option A (YOU) C B B B
2nd option C B A (YOU) A (YOU) C
3rd option B A (YOU) C C A (YOU)
Please submit your ranking of teachers (J through N) from your first choice to
your last choice. Please rank ALL five teachers!
1st option 2nd option 3rd option 4th option 5th option
This is the end of the first mechanism.
After we collect your Decision Sheet, you will be given the Instructions and
the first Decision Sheet for a new mechanism.
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